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NO PLACE TO CALL HOME: THE IRAQI KURDS UNDER THE
BA’ATH, SADDAM HUSSEIN, AND ISIS
CRAIG DOUGLAS ALBERT, PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Kurds are the largest ethnonational group without their own
state. 1 They are often considered a people in search of their homeland or a
people without a state. 2 Although Kurds are situated in four distinct
states—Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—the largest swath of Kurdish territory, referred to as “Kurdistan,” is in Iraq. 3 It is in this region where some of
the most egregious crimes against the dignity of an ethnic people have been
committed.
This paper argues that Iraq has violated Kurdish dignity throughout
recent history by utilizing examples from three main phases of dispossession: Iraq’s Ba’athist’s attempts to “Arabize” or “Iraqify” the Kurds
through the 1970s; Saddam Hussein’s efforts to eradicate the Kurds
through the 1980s, culminating with the al-Anfal campaigns; and presently,
the Islamic State’s (ISIS) bid to gain control of Kurdish territory, and the
Iraqi government’s inability to protect the Kurds from ISIS. It uses this
historical structure to show that the Iraqi treatment of Kurds has been purposeful and systematic. This paper asserts two main points: first, it confirms that the case of the Iraqi Kurds constitutes an example of a dignity
taking, adding breadth and depth to the burgeoning field of dignity takings;
second, it seeks to expand upon the notion that the denial of self* Associate Professor of Political Science, Augusta University. Dr. Albert received his B.A. in Political
Science at Augusta State University in 2001. He received his M.A./Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut, 2009. Dr. Albert’s area of concentrations were International Relations, specifically ethnic
conflict, as well as American Politics. He publishes frequently on ethnic conflict and the Scholarship of
Teaching and Learning. In 2013, he testified before a joint sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee in the US Congress on the Threat of Chechen Extremism. He currently directs the Model
United Nations Program for Augusta University. The author wishes to thank his research assistants
during the course of this project: Kirsten Fitzgerald; Charles Murdorf; Emily Williamson; and in
memory of Rowan Feldhaus. You may follow Dr. Albert on Twitter and Facebook: @DrCraigDAlbert.
1. Sarah Leduc, The Kurds: The World’s Largest Stateless Nation, FRANCE 24 (July 30, 2015),
http://www.france24.com/en/20150730-who-are-kurds-turkey-syria-iraq-pkk-divided
[https://perma.cc/NU62-M8FP] .
2. See generally KEVIN MCKIERNAN, THE KURDS: A PEOPLE IN SEARCH OF THEIR HOMELAND
4 (2006) (“[T]he Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state.”).
3. DAVID MCDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDS 3 (3d ed. 2004).
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determination is a dignity taking. Further, it contends that the denial of selfdetermination to a particular group with the will and capacity for selfgovernance should be included as an example of infantilization.
II. DIGNITY TAKINGS EXPANDED: SELF-DETERMINATION AS
INFANTILIZATION
Although the concept of a dignity taking is relatively new to the takings literature, it has already achieved substantial scholarly impact. Bernadette Atuahene originally defined dignity takings as occurrences “when a
state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from
owners or occupiers whom it deems to be sub persons without paying just
compensation or without a legitimate public purpose.” 4 Atuahene conceptualizes sub persons as those who are infantilized or dehumanized. 5 The
processes of dehumanization and infantilization seek to deny recognition of
an individual or group’s humanity or full mental capacity. 6 In a recent article, Atuahene updated her conceptualization, identifying that “[a] dignity
taking occurs when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates
property rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.” 7
Dehumanization is the state’s failure to recognize either an individual
or a group’s humanity. 8 In other words, a dehumanized person’s being or
essence is invisible, and the person is classified as an unfit participant of
the social contract. 9 Dehumanization can result from an outright denial of
an individual or group’s humanity, for example, by equating them to animals, insects, or inanimate objects. 10 For example, this can be seen in
commonly reported claims that Russian President Vladimir Putin degraded
Chechens in exclaiming that he would “flush them all down the toilet,”
which symbolically relegates Chechens to nothing more than human ex4. BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S
LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM 3 (2014).
5. Id. at 30.
6. Id.
7. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016) [hereinafter Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration]; see also
Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 178 (2016).
8. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 31 (“When an individual or community’s humanity is invisible,
they are no longer regarded as humans having the mental acumen, soul, or agency necessary to enter
into the social contract.”).
9. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 7, at 801.
10. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 31.
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crement. 11 Similarly, Atuahene asserts that “[d]ehumanization will result
from the use of deadly force since death is the most extreme form of extinguishing one’s humanity.” 12
Infantilization, on the other hand, restricts an individual or group’s autonomy through the refusal to acknowledge and respect its full capacity to
reason. 13 This is most clear when a regime refuses to acknowledge a person
or group’s capacity for autonomy and self-governance. 14 Accordingly, although an individual or group’s humanity is recognized, their ability to determine their own future, through autonomous rule, is not. In these
instances, individuals are kept under the authority of another without consent or through forced consent. Atuahene clarifies the concept poignantly:
“Most commonly, infantilization involves treating adults as if they were
minors, and thus placing them under the authority of another. The social
contract requires an individual’s consent to be governed, so until children
develop the mental faculties necessary to consent, they are unequal citizens.” 15
Dehumanization is based upon the loss of human worth whereas infantilization is the restriction or denial of autonomy based upon the rejection of one’s capacity to reason. 16 As so conceptualized, this paper
confirms the Iraqi Kurds as suffering a dignity taking because the Iraqi
state has systematically and involuntarily taken property from the Kurds,
while also denying these individuals’ humanity and worth. Kurds in Iraq
have the unlucky distinction of facing both dehumanization and infantilization from the Iraqi regime. As evinced below, the Iraqi regime systematically removed Kurds from their property without just compensation and
consent, and Iraq’s Kurdish population has continuously been the victim of
indiscriminate mass killing, ethnic cleansing, and acts of genocide. These
acts clearly fit within Atuahene’s understanding of dehumanization and
closely resemble her example of communist-era expropriations to the extent that communist regimes systematically used deadly force to carry out
forced transfers of property. 17 Furthermore, Iraq has failed to grant Kurdi11. Putin’s Chechen Remark Causes Stir, BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2002),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2460305.stm [https://perma.cc/5JXW-5UMX].
12. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 31.
13. Id. at 32.
14. Id.
15. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 32.
16. Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, supra note 7, at 801.
17. ATUAHENE, supra 4, at 31–32 (“[A]lthough the stated purpose of most communist-era expropriations was to redistribute property and to create egalitarian societies—to the extent that communist
states systematically used deadly force to carry out the forced transfers of property—dehumanization
occurred.”).
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stan full sovereignty and, in most cases, autonomous self-rule despite the
fact that the region and its inhabitants have expressed a willingness and
capacity for self-governance. 18 Currently under threat from ISIS, Iraq has
been unable or unwilling to protect its own population, let alone the Kurds.
Iraq’s reliance on the Kurds to fight their own military campaign against
ISIS and simultaneous refusal to grant the Kurds more autonomy or outright sovereignty is, at worst, active infantilization and, at best, passive
infantilization.
Infantilization’s meaning ought to include a state’s active or passive
denial of a group’s right to self-determination when a willingness and capacity to self-govern is present. If a people wish to govern themselves and
can do so without creating the conditions for a failed or rogue state, then
denying this right (especially in the case of ethnonational groups that have
a distinct identity) denigrates that group’s capacity, and hence rationality,
for self-rule. Unless the regime can justify that a failed state or rogue state
is likely to result from the recognition of another group’s selfdetermination—therefore likely to cause more conflict, death and destruction—then not granting that right is a clear violation of human dignity.
Expanding the concept to the denial of self-determination also fits
within the original depth of Atuahene’s conceptualization of infantilization
as demonstrated when she writes, “infantilization involves treating adults
as if they were minors, and thus placing them under the authority of another.” 19 In this case, a regime is treating an entire ethnonational group as if it
were a minor, not having the capacity or reason to effectively self-govern.
Because the Kurds have suffered involuntary property loss (including physical structures, ancestral territory, and ownership of the self), mass killings,
and the denial of self-determination, Kurdistan clearly exists as an illustrative case-study of when a dignity taking has occurred. The Iraqi regime has
systematically played the role of an authoritative adult, and the Iraqi Kurds
represent the non-consenting minor. Under this view, it becomes clear that
the denial of national self-determination is a form of infantilization.
Self-determination is generally conceptualized as groups comprising
ethnic nations that exist under the sovereignty of another entity and that
seek greater self-rule, autonomy, or independence. 20 The concept implies a
group’s capacity, willingness, and ability to be self-governed. Self18. See generally MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 323–40 (discussing the history of Kurdish attempts at autonomous self-government in Iraq between 1968 through 1975).
19. ATUAHENE, supra note 4, at 32.
20. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, Understanding Strategic Choice: The Determinants of Civil
War and Nonviolent Campaign in Self-Determination Disputes, 50 J. PEACE RES. 291, 292 (2013).
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determination concerns a controlled group seeking to gain control of its
destiny from an authoritative center that is reluctant to resolve the claims of
the group in question. 21 To understand the denial of national autonomy as a
form of infantilization, the national right to self-determination must be
clearly situated in the context of human rights and international law. In
other words, self-determination must be recognized as a basic human right
as codified by the Charter of the United Nations (1947), which declares
self-determination as a necessary condition for universal peace. 22 In its
purpose and principles, the UN Charter asserts, as its second purpose, “[t]o
develop friendly relations among nationals based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” 23 The United Nations further elaborates on the concept of inherent right of national selfdetermination in its Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations. 24
This declaration on principles of international law refers to the sovereign’s requirement to respect a people’s right to self-determination in nonambiguous terms. It states, “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from any
forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to selfdetermination and freedom and independence.” 25 This right to selfdetermination is further codified in international law through the UN Declaration of Indigenous Rights, which ensures indigenous peoples the right
of self-determination within existing states; protections against genocide
and ethnocide; protections for their own cultures, institutions of governance, special relationship to the land, and traditional economic activities;
and representation on all bodies making decisions about them. 26 Although
one can debate what groups qualify as ingenious versus a national minority
versus a stateless nation, international law categorically rejects any discrimination or repression of these individuals and requires a state to protect
collective group rights.
If it is a duty of the sovereign to allow self-determination, then denying that right without reason conflicts with international law. Philosophical21. Id.
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶2.
23. Id.
24. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
25. Id.
26. Prosper Nobirabo Musafiri, Right to Self-Determination in International Law: Towards
Theorisation of the Concept of Indigenous Peoples/National Minority? 19 INT’L J. MINORITY & GROUP
RTS. 481, 492 (2012).
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ly, protecting this right maintains a sovereign’s legitimacy. If the sovereign
denies this right and seeks to impose its will with force upon its own people
in violation of self-determination, it loses legitimacy. A national minority
or indigenous group (including ethnonational groups), as Musafiri writes,
has “a right to self-governance in circumstances where the dominant culture would otherwise conflict with their own.” 27 Thus, it is a wellestablished concept in international law that a people have the right to selfdetermination. As Juan Carlos de las Cuevas explains, “international law
seems to accord a great deal of recognition to the principle of selfdetermination, by granting this right to all of mankind and forbidding states
from departing from it.” 28 Of course, there has been considerable academic
and diplomatic debate about how and when a people should be allowed
self-determination, especially when doing so may create instability, conflict, and war or when it is deemed that a people are not capable of selfgovernance. 29 Many critics blame self-determination for instigating violent
conflict—especially when self-governance would result in a failed or rogue
state. 30
Self-determination has it limits, however. Especially when achieving
it involves violence. Velasco writes, “[t]he tragedy of human history, however, is that secessionist aspirations have often incarnated in violent form;
and self-determination has been blamed for fueling the violence.”31 However, this paper is arguing for self-determination when there is a willingness and a capacity for self-governance and doing so would not create war.
Moreover, when a regime is already at war against a people, refusal to
grant self-determination is beyond rationality because no valid argument
can be made that doing so will create undue conflict. Thus, it is a form of
infantilization and an affront to human dignity not to grant selfdetermination in these instances of deadly conflict.
When a people desire self-determination, the denial or refusal of that
right is a clear example of infantilization, and it further develops Atuahene’s original conceptualization of infantilization. To then deny selfdetermination to any group that has the capability and willingness to self27. Id. at 532.
28. Juan Carlos de las Cuevas, Comment, Exceptional Measures Call for Exceptional Times: The
Permissibility under International Law of Humanitarian Intervention to Protect a People’s Right to
Self-Determination, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 491, 500 (2015).
29. Kyle Beardsley et al., Resolving Civil Wars before They Start: The UN Security Council and
Conflict Prevention in Self-Determination Disputes, 47 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 675, 675 (2015).
30. Id. at 677.
31. Zoilo A. Velasco, Self-Determination and Secession: Human Rights-Based Conflict Resolution, 16 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 75, 77 (2014).
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govern is to deny a basic human right and should be an instance of a dignity taking, specifically as a form of infantilization. The foundation for this
has already been discussed by Richland, who argues that a group’s dignity
“is to be found in precisely the place they have always insisted it is—in
their (self-) determination.” 32 In fact, Richland goes so far as to say that, in
the case of the Hopi people, proper “reparations” or dignity restoration—
explained below—can happen only when a nation’s inherent sovereignty is
recognized. 33 Richland believes that the U.S.’s disparate acts of dispossession and the failure to recognize the self-determination of the Hopi people
forms a pattern of ongoing indignity and dispossession and thus should be
characterized as dignity takings. 34 In this Article, I will build upon his contribution.
III. THE DEHUMANIZATION AND INFANTILIZATION OF THE IRAQI
KURDS
A. Ba’athist Arabization of Kurdistan in the 1970s
Much of the antagonism between the Kurds and Iraq results from arguments over Kurdistan’s vast oil reserves. 35 The point of contention has
generally followed a pattern: the Kurds negotiate for autonomy to control
and have greater access to Kurdistan’s oil; negotiations falter and eventually lead to rebellion and conflict; the Iraqi regime pursues harsh policies
against Kurdish rebels and civilians; and then argues that it will maintain
the Kurdish lands as a punishment against the Kurdish rebellion. Eventually, Kurdish politicians start a movement toward negotiation, and the cycle
begins again. Baghdad, throughout its regime cycles in the twentieth century, has used two main arguments to deny Kurdistan full autonomy: first, a
divided Kurdistan would hinder the Iraqi nationalist movement, which
sought to create a greater Iraq that would be the center of the Arab world. 36
This mirrored similar Arabization policies throughout the Middle East in
the 1960s and 1970s. Second, and perhaps more practically, Iraq wanted to

32. Justin B. Richland, Dignity as (Self-) Determination: Hopi Sovereignty in the Face of US
Dispossessions, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 917, 922 (2016).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 934.
35. Erin Banco, The Curse of Oil in Iraqi Kurdistan, GLOBAL POST INVESTIGATIONS (Jan. 17,
2017),
https://gpinvestigations.pri.org/the-curse-of-oil-in-iraqi-kurdistan-1c9a9a18efd1
[https://perma.cc/U6AT-YMT3].
36. Craig Douglas Albert, A History of Violence: Ethnic Group Identity and the Iraqi Kurds, 17
IRAN & CAUCASUS 215, 217 (2014).
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maintain control of the economic potential of Kurdistan. The Ba’athist
Revolution of July 1968 illustrates this process.
The Ba’ath Party took power from the Qasim Regime that had controlled Baghdad since its own July Revolution of 1958. 37 The Ba’ath Party
held a radical Arabist ideology partly founded upon hostility toward nonArab Kurds, who are culturally and linguistically related to the Persians. 38
The Ba’ath Party also sought to secure its newfound position in Baghdad
and therefore sought cooperation with the Kurds. 39 Taking advantage of a
potential ethnic-civil war between Kurdish groups in the late 60s and early
70s, and needing to quickly consolidate its position, the Ba’ath, under the
direction of Saddam Hussein (who was then second-in-command of Iraq),
reached a peace accord with Kurds. 40 The March 11, 1970 peace accord,
known as the “March Manifesto,” established the cornerstone for future
relations between the Kurds and Iraq 41 and recognized the dignity of the
Kurds, if only briefly. By most accounts, the peace accord was not a
Ba’athist attempt to legitimize the Kurds’ autonomy but rather a plan to coopt them until the party fully securitized its position. 42 This accord is an
instance of infantilization. Saddam pretended to recognize the Kurds’ right
to self-rule while the maneuver actually bought time to better situate Ba’ath
forces to assert authority and dominance over Kurdish lands and people.
However, much worse was to come.
The peace accord quickly collapsed, partly due to burgeoning Kurdish
alliances with Iraqi enemies, certain Kurdish elitist insistence on greater
independence, and the Ba’athist rejection of Kurdish nationalism. The Iraqi
regime seemingly tried once more to establish a permanent agreement on
federal relations with Kurdistan by publishing the Autonomy Law of
1974. 43 However, rival Kurdish organizations could not agree on the law’s
terms. 44 Some argued it was the closest Kurdistan had ever come to self37. Id.
38. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST
KURDS
(1993),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/i/iraq/iraq.937/anfalfull.pdf
THE
[https://perma.cc/SYQ4-X3LJ].
39. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 324–25.
40. Id. at 326–28.
41. Id. at 327 (“The accord reached and issued on 11 March as the government’s policy on the
Kurdish issue . . . has remained the Kurds’ favoured foundation stone for future relations with the rest
of Iraq.”).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 335–37 (“The terms of the Autonomy Law set out the Baath position, one that went
further than any previous legislation, but which fall short of Kurdish demands regarding Kirkuk and
regarding the real seat of power.”).
44. See id. at 335–36 (discussing how provisions of the Autonomy Law allowed Baghdad to
retain powers that could effectively strip the Kurds of self-control).
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actualization, while others believed that it did not go far enough in recognizing Kurdish self-determination and that it was dictatorially implemented. 45 After its proposal, Saddam Hussein gave the Kurds two weeks to
accept the Autonomy Law. 46 The Kurdish factions could not agree and war
broke out in 1974 and 1975. 47 Finally, during the war and its aftermath,
Iraq began the dispossession of its Kurdish population to resolve its Kurdish problem.
The tyrannically imposed Autonomy Law appeared to grant substantial autonomy to the Kurds, but it actually centralized power, even in the
autonomous zones throughout Kurdistan. Put simply, the law created more
control disguised as autonomy. Yildiz argues that the law’s autonomous
region accounted for less than half of what the Kurds recognized as Kurdistan. 48 It created legal limitations that substantially qualified autonomy.
Central authority figures were authorized to give general guidance to local
Kurdish officials, and perhaps the most telling was a state minister being
authorized to attend all meetings of all autonomous bodies. 49 Further, all
decisions made by local Kurdish bodies could be contested by Iraq’s Minister of Justice and could be suspended by the Iraqi Court of Cassation. 50
Taken together, these qualifications of the Autonomy Law of 1974
highlight why the law’s label was nothing but a misnomer. It clearly
demonstrated the Ba’athist contempt for Kurdish autonomy and their belief
that the Kurds lacked the capacity for self-governance. Certainly, from
Iraq’s perspective, Iraq was attempting to parent its unruly children. To
make matters worse, the Ba’ath enacted this law after the Kurds believed
they were making headway with the Kurdish rights outlined in the March
Manifesto. The unilateral implementation of the Autonomy Law of 1974
was a dignity taking disguised as a “dignity giving” spectacle.
The war and its immediate effects are clear examples of the dehumanization that accompanies dignity takings. Iraq went to war with more than
90,000 fighters, 1200 tanks and armored cars, and 200 aircraft.51 Kurdish
forces numbered about 60,000 Peshmerga, or guerilla fighters (literally

45. See id. at 337 (“They and others joined the National Front in Baghdad, arguing that the Autonomy Law was the best they could hope for and should be supported. Other Leftist Kurds believed
that Saddam Husayn was no longer serious about an agreement. The Autonomy Law, for them, was by
dictat.”).
46. KERIM YILDIZ, THE KURDS IN IRAQ: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 20 (2004).
47. See MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 337–38.
48. YILDIZ, supra note 46, at 21.
49. Id. at 21.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 23.

826

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:3

translated as those who confront death), and about the same number of
irregular forces, all temporarily supported with Iranian artillery and antitank missiles. 52 The Kurds’ only chance to defend their territory was with
the help of Iran and hope of assistance from the United States. U.S. assistance never came. Iraq and Iran eventually negotiated the Algiers Agreement of 1975, which ended Iran’s support of the Kurds, and settled other
non-Kurdish related issues between the two states. 53 Iraqi forces took immediate advantage of this.
The Iraqi army created a security zone surrounding Kurdish regions
bordering Turkey, Syria, and Iran, measuring 600 miles in length54 and
about 19 miles deep. 55 Within this security zone, the Iraqi military destroyed an estimated 1500 villages. 56 Additionally, the Iraqi government
resettled at least 600,000 people (including women and children) to mujama’at, or collective camps. 57 The resettlement campaign deported Kurds
from their ancestral homelands to Arab dominated areas, and according to
Human Rights Watch, many Kurds died in the relocation efforts, although
there are no exact figures available. 58 Summary execution without trial
awaited any Kurd caught inside Kurdistan after resettlement. 59
The Iraqi government brought ethnic Arabs into razed Kurdish villages to transition formerly Kurdish provinces into Arab dominated districts.
The most telling evidence of this displacement includes interviews with
Arabs who were relocated, sometimes forcibly, into the Kurdish lands. In
an interview conducted by Human Rights Watch, an Arab tribesman stated:
“We moved because there was an order from the government to move to
this village. Whether I was happy or unhappy, I had to obey that order.
During the last regime, if the government gave an order to the people to do
something, they had to obey.” 60 A leader from Kis Qal’a village said:
The eviction and expulsion happened in one day, and on the same day
they brought the Arabs . . . . They came and ordered us to leave Kis
Qal’a. We could choose where we wanted to go, but the only condition
52. Id.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id.
55. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 339 (“[T]he regime created a security belt along the Iranian and
Turkish borders, which progressively widened from 5 km to eventually 30 km in places.”).
56. YILDIZ, supra note 46, at 24.
57. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 339.
58. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38.
59. MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 339 (“Anyone caught returning to their ancestral homesteads
was summarily executed, without regard for age or sex.”).
60. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLAIMS IN CONFLICT: REVERSING ETHNIC CLEANSING IN
NORTHERN
IRAQ
12–13
(2004),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/iraq0804.pdf
[https://perma.cc/249F-CRZA].
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was that it had to be above the town of Atrush [located inside the then
just declared Kurdish autonomous zone]. The ones who came to expel us
were the heads of Shaikhan district, with the police and [Ba’athists]. The
expulsion was peaceful, but we were ordered to leave.
...
We were settled in a remote area . . . . We arrived at the end of April, in a
field of grass. We had to build our own houses from mud. 61

The Ba’ath made it almost impossible to own property deeds in traditional Kurdish territory. Jaji Muhammad Ya’qub Hussain claims: “There
were 188 villages in Shaikhan. The government cancelled all of the property certificates of the Kurds and the other nationalities in the villages . . . . The law of 1975 Arabized the whole area, and brought the Arabs to
all of the Kurdish villages.” 62 In the most telling example of ethnic dilution
by the Iraqi regime, the Ba’ath encouraged Arabs to start taking Kurdish
wives in an attempt at ethnic assimilation or ethnic dispersion, to guarantee
an Arab majority in all regions and thereby negate the need for Kurdish
autonomy. 63 Additionally, the war created at least 200,000 Kurdish refugees within Iran alone, with an undetermined total killed. 64
The Iraqi regime dehumanized the Kurds by creating a security zone,
forcibly resettling the Kurds, killing all those who refused to obey these
policies, razing villages, refusing land deeds, and encouraging ethnic assimilation bordering on ethnic cleansing. The Iraqi regime also demonstrated its contempt for Kurdish self-rule by refusing their rights to their
ancestral homeland, refusing greater autonomy, and redrawing traditional
Kurdish territories and Arabizing the provinces. Each of these policies
denies the inherent human right of self-determination and forces a group
wishing for self-governance to live under the authoritative centralized control of “outsiders.” This is the first occurrence in what has become a pattern
of dignity takings.

61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 29. Although the Arabs interviewed believed that the Iraqi government had compensated the Kurds, “[i]n all likelihood, Iraqi government propaganda asserted that all displaced families
had been compensated, but such compensation did not actually take place.” Id. at 32.
63. See MCDOWALL, supra note 3, at 340 (“Other distasteful measures included financial rewards
to Arabs who took Kurdish wives, a deliberate encouragement of ethnic assimilation, the transfer of
Kurdish civil servants, soldiers and police out of Kurdistan, the removal of Kurdish faculty from the
new university in Sulaymaniya and the Arabizing of some place names. Undoubtedly Baghdad also
resorted to arrests, torture and executions to ensure its writ went unchallenged.”).
64. Id. at 339.
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B. The Spoils (Al-Anfal)
According to McKiernan, Anfal is an Arabic term taken from the
Quran in which followers of Mohammed raided and pillaged lands of nonbelievers; it specifically refers to the spoils of war captured from infidels.65
Al-Anfal represents the culmination of violence against the Kurds by Saddam Hussein, his Tikriti Ba’ath compatriots, and the Iraqi military. AlAnfal was Saddam’s attempt to punish the Kurds for their disobedience and
constant rebellions against his vision for Iraq. Al-Anfal eliminated an estimated 182,000 Kurds. 66 The full, eight-phase campaign took place between
March 1987 and April 1989, 67 but the deadliest crimes occurred in 1988.
The Iraqi regime orchestrated Al-Anfal to suppress ethnic rebellion in
Northern Iraq and to stop Kurdish fighters from assisting Iran in its war
with Iraq (1980–1988). 68 In effect, the Iraqi regime treated the Kurds as
animals. As one victim reports: “The Iraqis wanted us to bow down. Saddam, especially, wanted us to bow down like dogs.” 69 This report demonstrates the dehumanization as experienced by the dispossessed.
Al-Anfal’s specific purpose was to cleanse the region of all saboteurs,
who the regime defined as including all males between the ages of fifteen
and seventy. 70 It was Saddam’s attempt to destroy Kurdistan. The statistics
concerning those killed and the property destroyed by the regime are staggering. Exact figures are disputed, but government forces destroyed anywhere from 3000 71 to 4000 villages, 72 displacing up to 1.5 million Kurds
either internally or internationally. 73 A member of the Kurdish Peshmerga
details his account of the destruction:
Ah, since 1961, we have struggled! We have faced many difficulties. All
of Saddam’s oppression operations, all the chemical bombings, all the
mass graves. Many people for example, know of Halapja. No one defended us. More than 5,000 Kurds died at Halapja, from Saddam’s chemical attacks. And there were so many Halapjas. So many villages
65. MCKIERNAN, supra note 2, at 38.
66. Jennifer Trahan, A Critical Guide to the Iraqi High Tribunal’s Anfal Judgment: Genocide
Against the Kurds, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (2009).
67. Michael J. Kelly, The Anfal Trial Against Saddam Hussein, 9 J. GENOCIDE RES. 235, 235
(2007).
68. YILDIZ, supra note 46, at 25-26.
69. Hajee Muhammad Abdullah Ismail, The Happy Warrior, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE
KURDS AFTER SADDAM 34 (Mike Tucker ed., 2004).
70. Carole A. O’Leary, The Kurds of Iraq: Recent History, Future Prospects, MIDDLE E. REV.
INT’L AFF., Dec. 2002, at 17, 18.
71. Albert, supra note 36, at 219.
72. DENISE NATALI, THE KURDS AND THE STATE: EVOLVING NATIONAL IDENTITY IN IRAQ,
TURKEY, AND IRAN 58 (2005).
73. Albert, supra note 36, at 219.
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destroyed. So many lives destroyed. The hell of Chemical Ali. And
Kurdish people are still suffering from diseases and cancer, from Saddam’s chemical attacks. 74

The Iraqi elites’ intent was to exterminate the Kurds during Al-Anfal
and to make Kurdistan uninhabitable. One witness of Al-Anfal recounts the
destruction of land and property:
In 1991, after the safe haven was established in Kurdistan, I returned to
my village. My village was gone. There was death everywhere. Dead
sheep and goats. Dead chicken. Dead cattle. All the livestock of the village was dead and rotting. And the beautiful stone houses were in ruins . . . . Roofs were torn down and walls shelled, mortared, bulldozed.
My village was destroyed, like 4,500 other Kurdish villages. And the water was poisoned; Saddam poisoned all the wells of my village. 75

Ali Hassan al-Majid, a cousin of Saddam Hussein, was in almost total
command of the campaign; after Al-Anfal, he became known as Chemical
Ali. In official documents concerning the operations, Iraqi government
officials made clear that Kurdish villages were to be evacuated (read as
“cleansed”) and demolished so that no house was left standing.76 Chemical
Ali allegedly backed up his orders with personal threats, insisting that if he
found any house intact after the operations, he would hold the section
commander responsible. 77 A Human Rights Watch report details the intent
and efficacy of Iraqi regime forces. It quotes an intelligence officer:
I got two IFAs [East German-built military trucks] full of explosives
from a warehouse in Erbil. I commandeered 200 bulldozers from civilians of Erbil—by force, with no payment. We started destroying mud
villages with bulldozers, and dynamiting the cement structures. We used
military engineers for this. 78

The report also notes that troops entered villages at dawn, filled water
wells to make them unusable, and destroyed electricity supplies. 79 Intelligence officials inspected the villages by helicopter and if any structure
were still standing, the section commander would have to return to finish
the job and risk disciplinary action. 80 The report stunningly states: “Many
74. Muhammad Salim Dosky, Fighting Spirit, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE KURDS AFTER
SADDAM, supra note 69, at 29, 31.
75. Ismail, supra note 69, at 33, 35.
76. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 59.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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villages [were] not so much demolished as pulverized.” 81 The report also
states that Kurds were not to be killed unless they actively resisted but, in a
strange twist of logic, Chemical Ali ordered that, if resistance did occur, the
entire village and all inhabits were to be killed in reprisals. 82 Furthermore,
the regime prohibited farming and grazing animals in the security zone.
Regime documents order that any person or animal found in the security
zone must be killed immediately. 83 Fawcett and Tanner note that killings
were much more regularized than Ali acknowledged. 84 They cite regime
sources that describe the operation’s intent to systematically eliminate people and property within the prohibited security villages. 85 Ali Hasan alMajid admitted that the Iraqi military units would surround and attack villages, round up and relocate inhabitants, and bulldoze them into mass
graves. 86
Al-Majid states in his own words: “Yes, I’ll certainly look after [the
Kurds]. I’ll do it by burying them with bulldozers. That’s how I’ll do it.” 87
Montgomery publishes accounts of Iraqi officials. One official document
states: “We are sending to you the families . . . who surrendered to our
forces in the area of Sofi Raza on April 15, 1988. Please take the necessary
measures against them according to the directives of the Northern Bureau
and acknowledge their arrival.” 88 Montgomery notes that this document
identifies the murder of 139 families, 307 individuals. 89 After reviewing the
official Iraqi archives, Montgomery concludes that “necessary measures”
refers to the execution of captives and notes that the names therein represent certificates of death for those individuals. 90
Iraqi officials attempted to make it impossible for Kurds to return to
their homes by deploying chemical weapons in up to 250 villages and
towns in the late 1980s. 91 One bystander illustrates the resulting death:
The next day, we moved out. Unbeknownst to us, the area had been previously attacked by the Iraqis with chemical weapons. One of my grand-

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 81.
JOHN FAWCETT & VICTOR TANNER, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION—SAIS PROJECT ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE OF IRAQ 9 (2002).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Bruce P. Montgomery, The Iraqi Secret Police Files: A Documentary Record of the Anfal
Genocide, 52 ARCHIVARIA 69, 70 (2001).
88. Id. at 89.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FAWCETT & TANNER, supra note 84, at 10.
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daughters, and one of my sons, were so very hungry that they tried eating
wild grass. Then, after several hours, they died clenching their stomachs,
with boils on their faces. 92

According to Human Rights Watch, this was the first instance in history where a government used chemical weapons against its own people. 93
Many Iraqi Kurds died in the chemical bombardments—innocent civilians
as well as Kurdish Peshmerga. Another eyewitness recounts:
I had four brothers and three sisters; two sisters and two brothers remain
alive. Both sisters are lame, from war wounds, suffered when Iraqi
troops attacked Bawarky in Al Anfal, 1988. One is paralyzed, and the
other has shrapnel wounds that crippled one of her legs. My paralyzed
sister went into a state of physical and mental collapse during Al Anfal
after her two sons died in the Iraqi Army’s chemical attacks on Bawarky.
All of my family’s sheep and goats—over 1,000, total—died in the same
chemical attacks. 94

In the town of Halapja alone, in March 1988, the Iraqi military used
multiple chemical weapons including Mustard Gas, Sarin, VX and Tabun,
which immediately killed 7000 Kurds95 and up to 5000 more from the
deadly, lingering effects of exposure to chemical weapons. 96 Muhammad
Mala Khader provides a first-hand account of Saddam’s chemical weapons
usage:
1988, with my men, we were attacked three times with chemical weapons. The Shaqlawa district, near Hawlerr, was the worst for me. I ordered
my men to wrap themselves in rough burlap bags. We wrapped rags over
our mouths, our eyes, and our noses. The Iraqi planes came, dropping
napalm and chemical bombs. There were 300 Kurds in a nearby village.
One hundred sixty died that day and one hundred forty survived and they
live today but they are terribly handicapped, with disabilities from the
chemical weapons. 97

The Iraqi military attacked the city from the air using conventional
cluster bombs indiscriminately, sending fighters and residents underground
into fallout shelters. The regime then shelled the town with poisonous gas
that descended underground into the shelters, killing fighters and civilians
92. Ahmed Hajee Mirkhan Bawarky, Life Must Go On, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE KURDS
supra note 69, at 15, 20.
93. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 38, at 27.
94. Bawarky, supra note 92, at 15–16.
95. Kelly, supra note 67, at 237.
96. O’Leary, supra note 70.
97. Muhmmad Mala Khader, The Lion in Winter, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF THE KURDS AFTER
SADDAM, supra note 69, at 1, 5.
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without distinction. 98 Ahmad Bhadey describes his experience of victims
trapped in the fallout shelters:
I heard the jets before I saw them. The voice of the jets made an explosion in my ears . . . . One jet dove over each village. Each dropped one
bomb . . . . These were chemical bombs Saddam attacked us with, the
chemical death. The villagers were crammed together in bomb shelters.
They died from the chemicals. I, myself, opened the large, heavy wooden door to one of the shelters. My Kurdish people lay inside, dead. The
stench was unbelievable. 99

Since the American-led Wars of 1991 and 2003, the Kurds were able
to turn the tide. After the First Gulf War (1990–1991), the U.S. alliance
created a safe haven and a no-fly zone in Iraqi Kurdistan. In effect, this
created a de facto Kurdistan, which formed its own autonomous government, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Most of the Iraqi regime’s atrocities ceased after this period, and with the Iraq War (2003–
2011), the Kurds seemed hopeful that they might gain greater autonomy
and perhaps independence. However, with the government of Iraq controlled by a divisive and non-inclusive leader, Nouri al-Maliki, and with the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, tragedy struck the Kurds once again.
C. The Islamic State and Iraqi Kurds: 2014–Present
The self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) occupies areas in Syria and
Iraq. Its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, aims to create an Islamic Caliphate
in the region. ISIS surprised both Kurdish forces and Iraqi regime elements
by successfully attacking Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. By most accounts, the Iraqi military quickly capitulated and abandoned their posts as
jihadists advanced. 100 Mosul is the largest town bordering the disputed
territories between Kurdistan and Baghdad. The Kurds then had to defend
both their homeland and the disputed territories (i.e., the territories that
Kurdistan claims for itself but that Baghdad refuses to grant to them). Iraqi
regime forces left the Kurds stranded. 101 ISIS elements quickly entered
Kurdish villages and enclaves, leaving the Peshmerga to fight for them-

98. MCKIERNAN, supra note 2, at 39–40.
99. Sanan Ahmed & Ahmad Abdullah Bhadey, Comrades in Arms, in HELL IS OVER: VOICES OF
THE KURDS AFTER SADDAM, supra note 69, at 37, 45.
100. Martin Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul, GUARDIAN (June 10,
2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamicmilitants-seize-control-mosul [https://perma.cc/X4SM-XNDH].
101. Id.
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selves as the Iraqi military rapidly dissipated. 102 The regime seemed incapable of assisting the Kurds, and, according to news reports, entire companies of Iraqi soldiers hastily left their defensive positions, ran through the
streets, and disposed of their uniforms (sometimes right down to their undergarments). 103 The Iraqi army’s failure caused many Kurdish cities and
villages to fall into ISIS’s hands or to become contested by ISIS.
In August 2014, ISIS made a huge incursion into Kurdistan, overrunning Kurdish forces in Sinjar and Makhmou, and reaching as far as Gwer,
fifteen miles from the Kurdish capital of Erbil. 104 In the Kurdish city of
Zumar, the Iraqi military quickly abandoned their posts and allowed ISIS to
acquire weapons that they then used to kill Kurds. 105 The Kurds faced ISISlaid IEDs, TNT, and booby traps in Zumar and surrounding villages; as
Barbarani writes: “A labyrinth of unexploded ordnance was strategically
placed to wreak havoc among civilians and military personnel.” 106 ISIS
fighters fought with such brutality that Kurdish fighters and civilians lived
in constant terror, resulting in lower morale: a disease that can cripple military forces. ISIS developed an efficient array of tactics including suicide
bombers, mines, snipers and the use of US equipment captured from the
Iraqi military by ISIS forces. 107
Many Kurds believe that the conflict they now face with ISIS results
from Baghdad’s policies and the military’s inefficacy. Iraq’s failure to protect Kurdistan—regarded as intentional by the Kurds 108—should qualify as
a dignity taking. This assertion is bolstered by the fact that although much
of Baghdad’s economy derives from Kurdish controlled oil, the Kurds
themselves receive little or no money in return, and the Kurdish government has been largely unable to pay its civil servants. 109 The Kurds insist
that Baghdad does not care for their right to self-rule, which is demonstrated by the lack of economic redistribution from the center to the Kurdish
periphery that generates much of their wealth in the first place.
102. Dexter Filkins, The Fight of Their Lives, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-lives [http://perma.cc/TZ27-KFU4].
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http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/.premium-1.624110
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ISIS has also dispossessed Kurds. First, ISIS lays claims to Kurdish
land by arguing that it reserves a right to reclaim all lands that were once
officially under the control of Islam’s historical Caliphates. Regardless of
any Kurdish claims to ownership, ISIS does not recognize any other land
claims than its own. A member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, Sa’ed
Mamuzein, stated, “ISIS terrorists have brought 218 families from Ramadi
and Beiji to live in Kurdish-Shabak properties surrounding Mosul.”110
Mamuzein continued, “Shabak-Kurds have fled in fear of ISIS, leaving
behind their belongings which are now seized by ISIS.” 111 Rudaw Media
Network notes that this is ISIS’s attempt at ethnic cleansing around Mosul,
taking all Kurdish property and lands and giving them to loyal Arabs; a
policy familiar to the Kurds throughout Iraqi history. 112 Other Kurdish
media outlets report that ISIS members are selling the captured Kurdish
villages to Arabs for between five and ten thousand U.S. dollars. 113 Duman
argues that one possible reason why ISIS is selling villages is to prevent the
Kurds from ever returning home. One report argues that the war with ISIS
has caused 372,000 Kurds to become Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs),
with the Kurdish Yazidi minority representing ninety-one percent of that
number. 114 Due to ISIS’s Arabization policies, traditionally Kurdish areas
now have a higher Sunni Arab presence. 115
Second, the violence that ISIS uses to contest and gain back these areas is brutal, qualifying as a dignity takings. As Gulmohamad writes: “In
general, [ISIS] has followed the policy of annihilating any resistance to its
authority by terrorizing other rebel groups, civil activists[,] and journalists
with cruel methods.” 116 He notes that ISIS has carried out brutal attacks
against the Kurds in Iraq because the Kurds disobeyed ISIS’s authority by
trying to help Syrian Kurds that ISIS massacred. 117 Most of the dehumanization by ISIS in Kurdistan has been against the Yazidis. ISIS executed
Yazidis in mass numbers; up to 100,000 men, women, and children fled
110. ISIS Evicting Kurdish Shabaks from Lands That Are Given to Arab Loyalists, RUDAW (Nov.
21, 2014), http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/21112014 [https://perma.cc/7YAB-PBKA].
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(Jan. 10, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://kurdishquestion.com/oldarticle.php?aid=dispossession-in-rojava-andpossible-solutions-in-rojava [https://perma.cc/3NEJ-2SJB].
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(2014).
115. Id. at 13.
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their homes and were trapped on Mt. Sinjar in Iraq, facing a humanitarian
disaster. 118 According to Fuccaro, Yazidis are the largest heterodox Kurdish group in the Mosul province. 119 To ISIS members, Yazidis are slaughtered because they are considered heretical because Yazidi Kurds do not
believe in the same form of Islam as does ISIS. 120 Members of ISIS do not
respect Yazidis nor think of them as human, and thus slaughter them at
will. ISIS even attempted acts of genocide of the Yazidis on Mt. Sinjar.
In other ISIS attacks against the Kurds, reports have surfaced of brutality and dehumanizing tactics. Khudhur Rasho witnessed two Yazidi men
executed and members of ten families, hands bound, taken by ISIS members. 121 According to the New York Times, Sami Hassan, a Yazidi, was
working at a hospital when a wounded ISIS member arrived and demanded
to know which sect he belonged to. 122 Hassan reported that he escaped
through a window while being shot at. 123 Presumably, the ISIS member
wanted to kill Hassan simply because he was a Yazidi Kurd. A Yazidi Minister of Parliament, Vian Dakhil, stated that ISIS was killing men, women,
and children, and that some women were even being sold into slavery.124
MP Dakhil said: “There is a collective attempt to exterminate the Yazidi
people.” 125 In a report by Amnesty International, a Kurdish man stated:
“They killed the 15 men and took the women and children and until now
we do not know what happened to them, where they are or if they are dead
or alive.” 126 A Yazidi woman noted her son had been abducted and killed:
“We have had no news of him since we fled three days ago. If he was alive
and well he would have contacted us.” 127
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To achieve justice where dignity takings have occurred, Atuahene argues that there must be a comprehensive remedy, which she calls “dignity
restoration,” that compensates injured parties for both the economic harm
and the dignity deprivation involved. 128 However, as Richland denotes,
reparation is not always possible without granting full sovereignty to
groups with collective identities. 129
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM DIGNITY TAKINGS TO DIGNITY
RESTORATION
In sum, dignity takings have occurred against the Kurds of Iraq. This
paper has demonstrated that the Kurds have been the victim of involuntarily property takings in physical structures, in ancestral land attached to their
cultural identity, and through the denial of self-ownership. The Kurds have
been the victims of both dehumanization through regime-perpetrated violence and infantilization by the constant denial of self-rule. I argue that
failure to grant self-determination constitutes infantilization when three
conditions are present: 1) the will to self-govern; 2) the capacity to selfgovern; and 3) when no greater conflict will result from granting sovereignty. If any of these three conditions are not present, infantilization has not
occurred. In these cases, refusing to recognize sovereignty is not a result of
denying reason and full mental capability to a collective group, but rather it
is about maintaining some semblance of peace and stability. In 1996,
Chechnya quickly devolved into a warlord society, with rampant anarchical
conditions in major cities, resulting in warring factions, mass violations of
human rights, and the rise of terrorist groups, creating an unstable and insecure environment. 130 Partly due to this result, Russia invaded again to restore law and order and effectively deny self-determination. 131 In this case,
however, infantilization did not occur because Chechnya did not meet all
three parameters.
Dignity restoration rests upon the principles of restorative justice; it
seeks to rehabilitate the dispossessed and to reintegrate the group into society with an emphasis on process. 132 Socio-legal and institutional processes
on behalf of the regime in power must be put in place to alleviate the damages done by a regime’s dehumanization and infantilization. Until this restoration is achieved, justice remains elusive.
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Perhaps the most appropriate dignity restoration is for the Iraqi regime
and the international community to recognize a sovereign Kurdish nationstate. The current constitution of Iraq already recognizes Kurdish federal
autonomy, and the Kurds are relatively freer than at any time in Iraq’s contemporary memory. Article 117 of Iraq’s constitution reads: “First: This
Constitution, upon coming into forces, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with its existing authorities, as a federal region.”133 It further
validates all decisions and laws passed in Kurdistan since 1992. 134 Article
141 reads:
Legislation enacted . . . shall remain in force, and decisions issued by the
government . . . including court decisions and contracts, shall be considered valid unless they are amended or annulled pursuant to the laws of
the region of Kurdistan by the competent entity in the region, provided
that they do not contradict with the Constitution. 135

Such language implies that the Iraqi government believes that the
Kurds are capable of self-rule. In fact, many scholars argue that Kurdistan
is a de facto independent state. 136 For instance, Stansfield argues that “[t]he
Kurdistan Region has already become a state-like entity” and illustrates
that Kurdistan has become institutionalized territorially, politically, and
economically. 137 Furthermore, Kelly argues, “Iraqi Kurdistan exists today
in a de facto sense, but struggles to exist in a de jure sense.” 138 Kelly even
observes that one hardly encounters an Iraqi federal official in Kurdistan,
noting that even customs issues and border posts are handled by Kurdish
government officials. 139 Furthermore, the Kurdish Peshmerga are the only
capable military forces defending the Kurds from ISIS, which shows that
the de facto nature of Kurdistan should become a de jure acceptance.
Most of Iraqi Kurdistan provides for itself economically through agriculture and oil wealth. 140 However, much of Kurdistan’s oil wealth is left
untapped as the regional government and the federal regime try to cooperate. There is no final solution as to who should govern Kurdish oil and
133. Article 6HFWLRQ'XVWXࡃU-XPKXࡃUÕࡃ \DWDO-ދ,UDࡃT>7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI,UDT@
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who—the Kurds or the federal government—should profit from that supply. However, Voller notes that the Kurds have acted unilaterally concerning its oil reserves in an attempt to consolidate sovereignty and exhibit this
self-rule to the international community. 141 The main source of unilateral
action stems from Kurdistan’s parliament passing a regional Petroleum
Law, ratified as the “Hydrocarbon Law” in 2009. 142 This law allows the
Kurdish government to contract independently with international oil companies through Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs). 143 The Kurds now
control their oil without needing support, agreement, or cooperation from
Baghdad.
The Kurdish government has already signed several contracts through
PSAs, including a substantial contract with ExxonMobil. 144 The Kurds
have asserted their rights to Kirkuk by incorporating these areas in their
PSAs with foreign firms. Furthermore, the Kurdish government demonstrates its capacity to govern itself through these unilateral actions. However, the Kurds argue their unilateral moves are legitimate, considering that
the central government is not fulfilling its side of the oil sharing arrangement between the two camps. 145
Accordingly, Kurdistan should receive seventeen percent of Iraq’s total oil revenue, but the Kurdish government contests that it only receives
between ten and eleven percent. 146 Through their PSAs, the Kurds now
have the capacity to pump approximately 45 billion barrels of oil and 99 to
201 trillion cubic feet of gas. 147 Combined with its military and political
realities, Kurdistan’s political economy demonstrates that the Kurds already govern themselves and could be recognized as a sovereign entity by
the international community as an effort toward full dignity restoration.
As a concept, dignity takings provide a useful framework to view regime practices and processes of dehumanization and infantilization. Dignity takings afford the scholar and practitioner a way to analyze crimes
against certain individuals or groups of people using a unified socio-legal
framework. By analyzing the Kurdish case, this essay has further devel-
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oped the concept of infantilization, which is central to the concept of dignity takings.

